Why did you really do it? Examining the distinction between kinds of reasons by Gascón, José Ángel
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 12 
Jun 3rd, 8:00 AM - 9:00 AM 
Why did you really do it? Examining the distinction between kinds 
of reasons 
José Ángel Gascón 
Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Gascón, José Ángel, "Why did you really do it? Examining the distinction between kinds of reasons" 
(2020). OSSA Conference Archive. 1. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA12/Wednesday/1 
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at 
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized 
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
1 
 
Why did you really do it? Examining the distinction between kinds of 
reasons 
 
JOSÉ ÁNGEL GASCÓN 
Centro de Investigación en Educación y Desarrollo (CIEDE) 
Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción (UCSC) 
Alonso de Ribera 2850, Concepción 
Chile 
jgascon@ucsc.cl 
 
Abstract: Studies in cognitive psychology have shown that many of our actions seem to be often influenced by 
irrelevant features of the environment, of which we are not aware. But exactly what reasons has the psychological 
research uncovered? In philosophy, a distinction has been made between normative, motivating, and explanatory 
reasons. Hence it is necessary to determine which of them have been revealed as the real reasons for our actions 
by the psychological research. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Human beings consider, at least sometimes, what reasons we have to do something. When we 
do, we usually act in the light of those reasons that seem to us to be the best. Imagine, for 
example, that I have been offered two jobs, one of which has a better salary and the other is in 
a city that I like. Which job I will accept depends on my weighing of those reasons and of 
which considerations are more important to me. After my decision, if I am challenged to justify 
it—“why did you do that?”—I will present those reasons that made me opt for one job rather 
than the other, hoping that the other people will see why I made the best choice. I will, then, 
engage in argumentation in order to show that those reasons that moved me to act in a certain 
way were the best reasons, all things considered.  
This can be considered as the standard, common-sense view of reasoned action and 
justification of actions. We justify our actions by presenting reasons, and those are precisely 
the reasons for which we acted. Characterisations of the rational person or the critical thinker 
which focus on reasons—as opposed to those which focus on the suitability of means to an 
end, for instance—tend to rely on this view of the relationship between reasons and action. 
According to Harvey Siegel, for example, a critical thinker is someone who is “appropriately 
moved by reasons” (1997, p. 49). And, in the literature on normativity and practical reasons, 
authors such as Scanlon (2014) and Kiesewetter (2017) define rationality in terms of 
responsiveness to reasons. 
The idea that we should justify our actions by putting forward the reasons for which we 
acted seems like a plausible one. After all, there is a tendency to see people as irrational—or, 
at the very least, hypocritical—when they act for one reason and afterwards attempt to justify 
their action by appealing to different reasons. Consider the case of someone who decides to 
study philosophy and holds that her reason for that decision is her love of knowledge, when in 
fact what moved her towards a philosophical career is her desire to enjoy a high cultural status. 
No doubt many of us would see that behaviour as falling short of rationality—or, if she is aware 
of her real motivation, as insincere. 
Indeed, the most common use of the term “rationalisation” refers to cases of that sort. A 
rationalisation, in this negative sense, is an attempt to explain an action performed by oneself 
that fails because it does not identify the considerations in light of which one acted in that way. 
As Audi explains (1985, pp. 159–160): 
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Many purported explanations of action fail because they are merely 
rationalizations, as where a person cites an altruistic reason he had for helping 
someone, when in fact he was motivated by selfish reasons. sort of case is the most 
typical kind of rationalization. 
 
People usually dismiss as “mere rationalisations” the reasons that they are offered when they 
suspect that those reasons do not explain the action. Such reasons, it is often said, would not 
be the “real reasons”. When people ask for reasons for an action, they usually want the reasons 
for which the action was performed, and it is those reasons—if anything—that can justify the 
action. 
However, if this is how we should understand the rational justification of actions, then 
apparently we are in serious trouble. The empirical research in the psychology of reasoning has 
shown that human beings are very bad at identifying the causes of our own actions. A growing 
number of empirical studies have provided evidence that we lack access to the knowledge of 
what considerations move us when we act. The reasons that we put forward when we are 
challenged to justify our behaviour are not, it seems, those reasons for which we acted; they 
are merely our best guesses about what could make our actions plausible—even though no 
doubt those guesses are sometimes right. Thus, in that sense, most of our justifications of 
actions seem to be rationalisations. As Mercier and Sperber put it (2017, p. 253): “Humans are 
rationalization machines.” 
How worried should we be by this conclusion? The purpose of this article is to give a 
tentative answer to this question. I believe that any such answer, if it is to be plausible, must be 
both philosophically and psychologically informed. Our philosophical accounts of practical 
reasoning need to take into account the empirical findings that indicate what feats human 
reason can and cannot achieve; and, at the same time, the psychological research must be based 
on a philosophical understanding of reasons so that it is clear what conclusions can and cannot 
be drawn from the empirical data. I will begin, in the next section, by reviewing the empirical 
studies in psychology of reasoning that cast doubt on our ability to detect the reasons that move 
us to act. Then, in section 3, I will present philosophical distinctions between kinds of reasons 
and I will provide an interpretation of the conclusions of psychological studies in the light of 
those distinctions. Finally, in section 4, I will draw some preliminary conclusions about how 
all this should affect our conceptions of justification of actions and of rationalisation. 
 
2. Psychological research on reasons for action 
 
Up until the 1970s, it was widely assumed by psychological researchers that we are aware of 
the mental processes that lead to our judgements and our behaviour (Kunda, 1999, p. 265). In 
order to study people’s choices and evaluations, investigators resorted to self-report 
questionnaires in which the participants in the experiments were asked to state why they 
behaved as they did. Researchers who attempted to study the grounds for liking a political 
candidate or for choosing a job, for example, simply asked people why they liked a certain 
candidate or why they chose a certain job. Even behaviour in hypothetical scenarios was 
sometimes studied by asking people what they would do in the situation in question. However, 
it eventually became manifest that such self-reports are not reliable. 
In their ground-breaking article, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) reviewed a series of empirical 
studies in which a particular stimulus demonstrably influenced the participants’ actions and 
judgements but, when interviewed, the participants denied that influence and tended to explain 
their behaviour by reference to other factors. An example is the large number of experiments 
that showed the existence of the “bystander effect”, the fact that people are less likely to help 
a person in distress if there are many other onlookers around (Latané & Darley, 1970). After 
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the experiments, Latané and Darley asked the participants whether their decision to help or to 
abstain from helping had been influenced by the presence of other people. Despite the robust 
evidence that showed that a greater number of onlookers correlated with a failure to help, the 
participants systematically denied that influence. As the authors explain (p. 124): 
 
We asked this question every way we knew how: subtly, directly, tactfully, bluntly. 
Always we got the same answer. Subjects persistently claimed that their behavior 
was not influenced by the other people present. 
 
Nisbett and Wilson conducted a series of small studies in order to investigate the accuracy of 
causal explanations of one’s own behaviour (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson & Nisbett, 1978). 
The experiments were designed in a way that resembled as close as possible situations of the 
real life, with little or no deception involved. Yet they were also designed so that the stimuli 
that would probably influence the participants’ behaviour were of a counter-intuitive sort and 
hence their influence could not be accounted for by the participants’ prior causal theories of 
how people behave (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 242). Therefore, those stimuli could only have 
been detected by the participants if they had genuine introspective access to their own cognitive 
processes. As expected, people were influenced by factors whose influence they could not 
detect—and, interestingly, the researchers themselves were highly unsuccessful in their 
predictions of which factors would influence them. 
In one of those studies (p. 243), the participants were asked to evaluate four pairs of 
stockings. They had to chose one of those pairs and, afterwards, they were asked why they had 
chosen it. The trick was that all the stockings were identical. Nisbett and Wilson observed that 
the stocking situated towards the right were preferred over the ones situated at the left. 
However, when the participants were asked about the reasons for their choices, the position of 
the article was never mentioned. In fact, when the researchers suggested that possibility to the 
participants, they denied it. The authors explain that (Wilson & Nisbett, 1978, p. 124): 
 
Only a quarter of the subjects required any prompting to explain the basis of their 
choices. Most of the subjects promptly responded that it was the knit, weave, 
sheerness, elasticity, or workmanship that they felt to be superior. […] Not a single 
subject mentioned the position of the stockings as a reason for the choice. 
 
Not only do we often fail to detect factors that cause our behaviours, but we also tend to report 
as reasons for our choices and judgements stimuli that actually had no effect on us. For 
example, in another experiment (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 246), the participants had to 
predict how much electric shock they would take. Some of them were said that the shocks 
would do “no permanent damage,” while the others were not given that reassurance. Then, the 
researchers asked the first group whether that comment had affected their predictions, and they 
asked the second group whether, had they made that comment, their predictions would have 
been different. Inclusion of the reassurance proved to have no effect on the predictions of how 
much shock the participants would take, but a majority of them reported that it affected their 
predictions. 
What all this evidence means is not merely that we are sometimes wrong when we report 
our reasons for our decisions and judgements—that would hardly be big news. Neither can it 
be concluded that we are always wrong; as Nisbett and Ross (1980, p. 211) admit, we are often 
accurate in our explanations of the reasons for our behaviour. The worrying implication of that 
research on self-reports is rather that we lack introspective access to the reasons that guide our 
behaviour. The process by which we arrive at a belief of why we did something is the same 
whether that belief is accurate or inaccurate: we infer it from the known data and from our prior 
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theories of human behaviour. That is, it is the same process that we follow when we propose 
causal explanations of other people’s behaviour (Ibid.). If, for example, I buy a bottle of water 
and I claim that I did so because I was thirsty, I am surely right. But this is so simply because 
we have a common-sense theory of why people usually buy bottles of water, and that theory is 
largely correct. Notice, also, that it would be just as easy to identify the reason why someone 
else bought a bottle of water. The problems begin when there is no prior theory or when that 
theory does not fit the case at hand. If we fail to help a person in distress because there are 
many other people around, or if we choose a pair of stockings because they are situated on the 
right, then we are likely to give a wrong account of our behaviour, since we have no prior 
theory about the relationship between those reasons and those actions. And, in those cases, we 
are just as likely to be wrong about our own behaviour as we are to be wrong about other 
people’s behaviour. The process is the same in both cases.1 
If that conclusion is correct, then the processes that cause our actions and judgements are 
unconscious, just as the processes that are responsible for perception or textual comprehension. 
Kunda (1999, pp. 270ff.) reviews other studies that provide evidence of those unconscious 
processes that influence our behaviour, including aspects such as implicit memory, subliminal 
perception and affect. Even though the conclusion that we never have introspective access of 
the stimuli that cause our actions is still controversial, some cognitive scientists have accepted 
its most dramatic implications regarding our conscious will. Evans, while admitting that there 
is a difference between voluntary and involuntary actions, questions the very existence of a 
conscious will (2010, p. 177): 
 
‘We’ are not conscious persons in control of our behaviour and the reflective mind 
does not equal a conscious mind. The conscious person is a construction of the 
brain, an illusory narrative that accompanies us through life. 
 
In the same vein, Wegner (2002) talks about the conscious will as an “illusion.” According to 
his theory of apparent mental causation, conscious will is not a cause of actions but simply a 
(possibly misguided) feeling that an action was caused by us. He explains (p. 336): 
 
Apparent mental causation suggests that the experience of consciously willing an 
act is merely a humble estimate of the causal efficacy of the person’s thoughts in 
producing the action. Conscious will is the mind’s way of signaling that it might 
have been involved in causing the action. The person’s experience of doing the act 
is only one source of evidence regarding the actual force of the person’s will in 
causing the action, however, and it may not even be the best source. 
 
Now, if we accept these psychologists’ conclusion that we are never introspectively aware of 
what factors influence our actions and judgements, and in fact we are often wrong about them, 
the question is: how big a problem is that for our philosophical theories about reasons for action 
and justification of actions? This is a very broad issue that cannot be solved in a single paper. 
As a first step, however, it would help to be clear about what exactly Nisbett and Wilson’s 
experiments uncovered. Did they identify our real reasons for action? Or did they show us 
simply the causes of our actions? Are they the same thing? Sorting out this conceptual issue is 
the purpose of this paper, and to this I move in the next section. 
 
 
1 Even though, of course, when it comes to our own behaviour we have access to data that we lack when 
we attempt to interpret someone else’s behaviour, such as feelings, goals, beliefs or memories (Nisbett & Ross, 
1980, p. 203). 
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3. What reasons are we talking about? 
 
The results of the experiments conducted by Nisbett and Wilson certainly seem to reveal 
something important that jeopardise our ideas of intentional action and justification of actions. 
But, what is it exactly that was identified in those experiments? In their articles, Nisbett and 
Wilson used a variety of terms to refer to that finding: “influences,” “explanation,” “causes,” 
“causal factors,” and “reasons” for choice. The point was that there seemed to be a mismatch 
between the reasons stated by the participants in the studies and whatever it was—influences, 
reasons, causes—that explained their choices. Thus, a necessary first step in the assessment of 
the implications of those studies for our philosophical theories is the clarification of these 
factors that explained the participants’ behaviour. 
The most natural interpretation, I believe, is that the experiments identified the causes of 
our actions and judgements. Now, it is well known that, according to certain philosophical 
views, reasons for action just are the causes of our actions. Davidson (1963) famously argued 
for that view. If that is how we should understand practical reasons, then the discovery that 
people lack direct awareness to the causes of their actions obviously challenges our practice of 
giving reasons for our actions. If we cannot detect the causes of our behaviour, and practical 
reasons are precisely those causes, then it seems that our justifications of actions are mere 
fictions. 
However, the philosophical literature has distinguished between different kinds of 
reasons, and Davidson focused on only one of them: the kind of reason that “explains the action 
by giving the agent’s reason for doing what he did” (p. 685). The same can be said of Searle 
(2001), who clearly differentiated between justification and explanation of actions, and stated 
that the latter must be a causal account (p. 110): 
 
[…] the explanation of why something should have been done or is a good thing 
to have been done is not always the same as why it was in fact done. In this book 
we are primarily concerned with explanations that explain why something 
happened, with explanations that state the reasons that the agent acted on or will 
act on. We are interested in justifications only insofar as they also explain why the 
agent acted or will act. Therefore I will distinguish between justifications and what 
I will call “justificatory explanations.” Justification does not always explain why 
something in fact happened, but an explanation of its happening, whether 
justificatory or not, has to explain why it happened. 
 
Thus, it is one thing to report what considerations motivated us to do something, and hence 
explain our action; it is something different to justify our actions with considerations that make 
them the right thing to do (cf. Dancy, 2000, pp. 20–25). The former kind of reasons has been 
called motivating reasons, whereas the latter has been called normative reasons. Thus, Parfit 
(1997, p. 99) says that normative reasons are those that we are looking for when we ask “What 
do we have most reason to want, and do?”; motivating reasons, on the other hand, are those in 
the light of which we act. Dancy explains the distinction this way (2000, p. 2): 
 
There is the question what were the considerations in the light of which, or despite 
which, he acted as he did. This issue about his reasons for doing it is a matter of 
motivation. There is also the question whether there was good reason to act in that 
way, as we say, any reason for doing it at all, one perhaps that made it sensible in 
the circumstances, morally required, or in some other way to be recommended, or 
whether there was more reason not to do it. […] This second question raises a 
normative issue. 
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Thus, we can act for a good reason, in which case our motivating reason is also our normative 
reason, but it is also possible for these two kinds of reasons to diverge. Imagine, for example, 
that I voted for a certain political candidate because it seemed to me that she was the most 
honest and competent one. Those were the reasons that I considered when I was deciding my 
vote, so those are the reasons for which I acted. When asked, I offer those reasons to justify my 
choice. In this case, my normative reasons are the same as my motivating reasons. But let us 
imagine a slightly different scenario. Imagine that, even though that political candidate was 
indeed the most honest and competent one, I did not take that fact into account when deciding 
my vote; instead, what motivated me to vote for her was that she was born in the same city as 
me. I still justify my vote before others by mentioning her honesty and competence, but I know 
that I voted for her because we were born in the same place. In this second case, my motivating 
reasons are different from my normative reasons. 
Let us differentiate, then, between: 
 
• Normative reasons: Considerations that make an action the right thing to do, that 
count in favour of doing that action. 
• Motivating reasons: Considerations that moved me to do something, those in the 
light of which I acted. 
 
As Dancy (2000, p. 2) and Alvarez (2009) argue, this reference to two “kinds” of reasons 
should not be understood as implying that there are really two sorts of reasons—reasons that 
motivate and reasons that justify. They are different kinds of reasons only in the sense that they 
are offered in answer to two different questions: (1) what makes that action right?, and (2) why 
did you do that action? Now, if we go back to Nisbett and Wilson’s experiments and ask what 
kind of reasons—if any—they have discovered, it is clear that we can rule out normative 
reasons. The purpose of the psychological experiments was not to find out what reasons people 
give to justify their actions. In fact, the reasons that the participants provided in the studies 
were put into question by the researchers—that was the point. The purpose was rather to check 
the accuracy of people’s reports of their reasons for action. The focus was on explanation of 
actions, not on justification. 
However, it is not clear to me either that the findings of the experiments refer to 
motivating reasons. Those findings do refer to factors that explain people’s actions, but 
motivating reasons are not simply any kind of explanation; motivating reasons explain actions 
only insofar as those actions were made in the light of reasons. That means that a causal factor 
would not count as a motivating reason if the agent has not consciously considered it and 
decided to act on the basis of it. For a cause of people’s actions to be a motivating reason, they 
must at least recognise it as a reason and be guided by it. Suppose, for instance, that I fell on 
the street because a car hit me. It does not make sense to say that my motivating reason for 
falling was that a car hit me, i.e. that I was motivated to fall by the hit of a car. No doubt the 
hitting of the car explains the event, but it is not an explanation in terms of motivation. 
The relationship between the factors that influenced the participants in Nisbett and 
Wilson’s experiments and the participants’ choices seems to be of a similar kind as the 
relationship between the hitting of the car and my fall. As we saw, in the experiment of the 
stockings, none of the participants cited the position of the stockings—the causal factor—as a 
reason for their choice. Similarly, in Latané and Darley’s experiments, the participants denied 
that the number of people present influenced their decision to help someone in distress. Thus, 
if those factors explain the participants’ behaviour, the explanation cannot involve motivation 
through reasons. 
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There is, however, a third possibility besides normative and motivating reasons: what 
Searle (2001, p. 111) calls “straight causal explanations” and Dancy (2000, p. 5) calls “reasons 
why.” These reasons do not involve considerations that the agent takes to favour some action. 
Actions that are explained on the basis of “reasons why” are not performed in light of those 
reasons, but simply caused by them. This is the case with the explanation of my falling by 
citing the hit of the car. Many other events involve this kind of explanations, in which no reason 
was considered by the agent, as Dancy reminds us (Ibid.): 
 
What explains why one person yawned may be that someone else yawned just next 
to them. What explains why he responded so aggressively may be that he is having 
trouble at home or that he has taken a particular form of medication. What explains 
why he gave this student a better grade than she deserved is that he was 
unconsciously influenced by the fact that she always dresses so neatly (or 
something even less defensible). What explains why so many people buy expensive 
perfume at Christmas is the barrage of advertising on the television. What explains 
why he didn't come to the party is that he is shy. In none of these cases are we 
specifying considerations in the light of which these things were done. 
 
Dancy states that what these explanations involve “is not a reason at all, really, but rather a 
cause” (p. 6). But Alvarez (2009, p. 184) argues that its being a cause does not exclude its being 
a reason, since both terms belong to different domains: that of causation and that of explanation. 
We use reasons to explain actions, and those reasons sometimes happen to be causes in the 
natural realm. Therefore, she proposes that, besides normative and motivating reasons, we 
should consider explanatory reasons. If we differentiate among different kinds of reasons on 
the basis of the role they play in answering different questions, then the question of what 
explains an action is substantially different from the question of what motivated the agent—
even though, of course, the same reason can answer both questions. 
We have, then, according to Alvarez’s proposal, three kinds of reasons: 
 
• Normative reasons: Considerations that make an action the right thing to do, that 
count in favour of doing that action. 
• Motivating reasons: Considerations that moved me to do something, those in the 
light of which I acted. 
• Explanatory reasons: Considerations that explain why I did something, what 
caused my action. 
 
Now, explanatory reasons are a better candidate for the kind of reasons that the psychological 
experiments revealed. They are causes that explain people’s actions without being at the same 
time motivating reasons, since people do not consider them and even deny their influence. They 
are causes in the same sense that taking a certain medication is the cause of aggressive 
behaviour. They influence our actions but we are unaware of that influence. 
There is one crucial difference between explanatory reasons and the other two kinds of 
reasons, and that difference is what makes the findings of psychological experiments so 
shocking: explanatory reasons do not necessarily involve human agency. Just as they can be 
used to explain human actions, they are also what explains events such as the rain, the collapse 
of a building or the movement of waves at sea. There are no normative or motivating reasons 
for events like these—water and buildings do not consider reasons and do not attempt to justify 
their actions. So, when human actions are explained on the basis of explanatory reasons that 
are not also normative or motivating, that certainly feels like our sense of agency itself is being 
challenged. That may be all right for certain human actions, such as yawns or sudden outbursts 
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of aggressiveness, but it is frightening to find out that it also involves actions for which we 
believe we have motivating reasons, such as choosing stockings of helping a person in distress. 
No wonder some cognitive scientists have concluded that conscious will is an illusion. 
So, should we give up any talk of normative or motivating reasons altogether? My answer 
would be that, once we have distinguished among kinds of reasons and have specified the role 
each of them plays, we can resist that conclusion. That is why it was so important to be clear 
about what kind of reasons we were talking about, and why that is the main topic of the present 
article. Of course, satisfactorily solving this issue would require a whole paper in itself, but I 
will attempt to outline at least the beginning of an answer. That is a task for the next section. 
 
4. Justification, motivation and rationalisation 
 
The practices of considering reasons for action and of exchanging reasons are specifically 
human. Our consideration of reasons allows us to say that our actions are not merely things 
that happen to us, but things that we wilfully do. Our ability to explain and justify our actions 
distinguishes us from dogs, trees and thermostats. But if the reasons that we report have no 
influence on our behaviour, as the experiments that we have seen suggest, then it begins to look 
as if reasons were merely epiphenomenal: they would play no role in the determination of our 
actions. 
Before drawing that conclusion, however, we should examine more closely a kind of 
reasons that, as we saw in the previous section, the psychological experiments did not address: 
normative reasons. Even though we often attempt to justify our actions by explaining why we 
performed them—by citing motivating reasons—normative reasons need not be also 
motivating reasons (Dancy, 2000, p. 3). Sometimes we simply argue that what we did was right 
without intending to explain what moved us to do it. Someone might, for example, argue that 
the choice of her academic career was a good one—because, say, it had good job prospects and 
it fitted her character—without even remembering why she chose it in the first place. 
Furthermore, normative reasons can refer to future actions as well as past actions, they arise 
when deliberating about what to do, and in that case there is no point in asking if those reasons 
are also what motivated us to do it—nothing has been done yet. So, arguably, the reality of 
normative reasons is not affected by discoveries in the empirical sciences about what influences 
our behaviour. That is just not their main role. 
Nevertheless, normative reasons would be rather pointless if they did not have any effect 
on behaviour at all. But I believe that both our everyday experience and the empirical research 
provides grounds for concluding that, at least sometimes, normative reasons do influence 
decisions. The idea that people can take decisions and change their minds on the basis of 
reasons that show that some action is the right thing to do seems to be a necessary assumption 
in order to account for much of human behaviour. This can be seen most clearly in 
psychological experiments involving interpersonal argumentation. As Mercier and Sperber 
(2017, pp. 264–265) point out, groups of people are more able to solve logical problems than 
individuals working alone, and this happens because people working in groups get convinced 
by good reasons. For example, Trouche, Sander and Mercier (2014) showed that people who 
are confronted with arguments or who have to argue are more likely to solve logical problems 
such as those of the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) and others. The experiments 
were designed in a way that ruled out the effect of degrees of confidence of some participants 
on others, measuring specifically the effects of good argumentation. Thus, they concluded that 
their results “make it clear that arguments, rather than confidence, are the main factor 
explaining the performance of groups discussing intellective tasks” (p. 1968). 
According to Mercier and Sperber, the human faculty of reason does not lead us to make 
better decisions but—at least sometimes—to make decisions for which we can come up with 
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good reasons (p. 255): “when people have weak or conflicting intuitions, reason drives them 
toward the decision for which it is easiest to find reasons—the decisions that they can best 
justify.” In such cases, then, the reasons that explain our behaviour might not be the reasons 
that we think—they are not those that support the best decision, as opposed to the most 
justifiable decision—but they are normative reasons nonetheless. So it seems that normative 
reasons can play a role in determining our actions. Normative reasons can influence us in group 
discussion, as Trouche et al. showed; or, even when there is no interpersonal argumentation 
taking place, the potential justification that we mentally rehearse leads us in the direction of 
the most acceptable normative reasons. 
Hence, normative reasons do not seem to be inert. They can lead people to take a decision 
or form a judgement. But then, when such a thing happens, we can confidently say that those 
are people’s motivating reasons. Just as in Nisbett and Wilson’s experiments there was no way 
that alleged motivating reasons played any role in determining behaviour, in the experiments 
reviewed by Mercier and Sperber there seems to be no alternative to granting normative reasons 
a causal role. Therefore, reasons are not a mere epiphenomenon; motivating reasons, i.e. 
conscious reasons with a causal power on our decisions, exist. 
Concluding that motivating reasons exist, however, is not concluding much if those 
reasons can only be reliably detected in the laboratory. And that is precisely the lesson that we 
should draw from the psychological research: people do not have direct access to the causes of 
our own actions, we just infer the possible causes from a body of data and a more or less 
accurate theory of human behaviour, so we can always be wrong about our alleged motivating 
reasons. We should not be confident that we did something for the reasons that we think we 
did it. We need to accept our unreliability even in the realm of our own actions. That does not 
mean that we are always wrong, of course. It simply means that there is no privileged position 
from which reasons for action can be detected, not even the position of the agents themselves. 
This is Nisbett and Ross’s conclusion (1980, p. 211): 
 
Empirically, this means that under most circumstances subjects will be right in their 
causal accounts if and only if observers, working with similar externally available 
information, also are right. 
 
Taking this conclusion seriously should, in my view, lead us to giving considerably less weight 
to motivating and explanatory reasons in people’s attempts to justify—or criticise—actions. 
Accounts of why we did something, for which reasons we did it, should not be given a 
predominant place in justifications of actions. Normative reasons should not depend, and 
should be kept separate from, motivating reasons. I believe this is a conclusion that we have to 
consider seriously in light of the unreliability of our reports of motivating reasons. If we do not 
want the weakness of those reports to be transferred to our practice of justifying actions, the 
kind of reasons that make an action right or wrong should be relatively independent of the kind 
of reasons that explain why that action was done. 
This may seem too radical a proposal, as it blurs the distinction between a genuine 
justification of an action and a rationalisation. Without that distinction, it may be thought that 
the very idea of rationality is in danger. I will use the rest of this section to attempt to dispel 
that worry. 
In the most common sense of the term, a rationalisation is a purported account offered 
by an agent of one of her actions that (Audi, 1985, p. 163): 
 
1. Offers one or more reasons for doing that action. 
2. Represents his doing that action as at least prima facie rational given those 
reasons. 
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3. Does not explain why the agent did that action. 
 
That is, a rationalisation is an attempt to justify an action (point 2) by offering normative 
reasons (point 1) that are not at the same time motivating reasons (point 3). Someone might, 
for example, justify his decision not to eat peppers by asserting that they are bad for his health, 
when in fact his motivating reasons is simply that he does not like them. But rationalisation so 
defined is exactly what, I have argued, theories of rational action should be more tolerant of. 
We should accept the fact that, as Mercier and Sperber (2017, p. 253) put it, humans are 
rationalisation machines. 
Is this a call for widespread irrationality? I believe that we can dissipate that fear if we 
do not underestimate the extent to which normative reasons can be criticised. A match between 
normative reasons and motivating reasons is not the only way to check the correctness of 
justifications—it is not, in fact, the main one or even the most demanding one. Normative 
reasons by themselves must fulfil several criteria for them to constitute a satisfactory 
justification. One of those criteria is, of course, that normative reasons must be true, they must 
mention real facts. This criterion already allows us to see where the participants in Nisbett and 
Wilson’s stockings experiment got their justification wrong: they mentioned particular features 
of the stockings that they chose that made them the best stockings in the lot, whereas in fact all 
the stockings where identical. There is no need to appeal to their motivating reasons in order 
to conclude that their justifications were flawed. 
Besides truth, we should expect an agent’s normative reasons to cohere with the 
normative reasons that the same agent has offered in similar circumstances. The principle that 
like cases should be treated alike is firmly established both in law and in ethics. The normative 
reasons offered in a particular case, therefore, should not be assessed in isolation from those 
offered in all the other cases that the agent has encountered. This principle helps us explain 
what might be wrong in the justifications offered by the participants in the bystander effect 
experiments performed by Latané and Darley. Surely, those who helped the person in distress 
in the scenario with few onlookers could have justified their action by saying that the person 
needed help, but if they do not help in a similar scenario with more onlookers, there might be 
an incoherence in the normative reasons they state.2 Again, as in Nisbett and Wilson’s 
experiments, we can talk about the rationality or irrationality of justifications without looking 
for motivating reasons. 
Consider, finally, Audi’s example, mentioned in the Introduction (Audi, 1985, pp. 159–
160): “a person cites an altruistic reason he had for helping someone, when in fact he was 
motivated by selfish reasons.” If what explains that action is selfish reasons, one would expect 
that the person would not behave the same way in a situation in which she again must help 
someone but the selfish reasons are absent—there is no benefit for her. That would reveal an 
incoherence in her attitude towards normative reasons between both cases. Otherwise, if her 
behaviour was consistently helpful, insisting on her selfish motivation in order to criticise her 
normative reasons would seem to entail a moral theory that is way too demanding. 
All this is not intended to mean that we should never take into account motivating reasons 
when assessing justifications. Even within the boundaries of a single action, a clear mismatch 
between normative and motivating reasons can be reprehensible. If it is clearly apparent, for 
example, that I intended to punch someone out of anger and, by sheer luck, I ended up moving 
him away from a bus that was going to run over him, saving his life, then I can hardly justify 
my action by saying that I saved his life. Anyone could see that my intention was to hit him. 
 
2 I say that there might be an incoherence because I am not sure that there is no relevant difference between 
the two scenarios to which the agent could rightly point out. After all, if there are many onlookers, the agent could 
always argue that she thought that someone would take care of the person in distress, and perhaps that is a 
legitimate expectation. 
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However, apart from clear cases like this one, our practice of giving and asking for 
justifications should not focus on mismatches between normative, motivating and explanatory 
reasons. We should accept that those mismatches are ubiquitous in human action, as the 
research in experimental psychology has shown, but at the same time we can be confident that 
we have the resources to assess normative reasons by themselves. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Research in cognitive psychology during the last five decades has shown that, in many 
situations, the reasons with which people explain their own actions and judgements do not 
correspond to the real factors that caused them. This finding has led to the conclusion that 
people do not have introspective access to the causes of their own behaviour; instead, people 
infer them, just as they would if they were observers of someone else’s behaviour. Such a 
conclusion seems to cast doubt on the significance of our practice of justification of actions 
and exchange of reasons. However, in order to fully understand the philosophical implications 
of the results of psychological research, we need to be clear about what kinds of reasons are 
psychologists talking about. 
In the philosophical literature, three kinds of reasons have been distinguished, according 
to the kind of question that they answer: normative reasons, considerations that make an action 
right; motivating reasons, considerations in light of which the person acted; and explanatory 
reasons, considerations that explain what caused an action or an event. The problem with the 
psychological experiments, we saw, was that the participants offered purported motivating 
reasons that did not explain their choices at all; instead, what explained their choices was 
explanatory reasons that the experiments uncovered and of which the participants were 
unaware. That challenges the reality of motivating reasons, and we are left only with normative 
reasons that, for all we know, could have no effect on behaviour whatsoever—they could be 
epiphenomenal. 
However, we also saw that certain behaviours could only be plausibly accounted for by 
the influence of normative reasons. If our performance in a logical task is better when there is 
argumentation, and if we tend to lean towards the most justifiable decisions when our intuitions 
are weak, that gives us grounds for believing that sometimes normative reasons do guide our 
actions. So normative reasons can also be motivating reasons. The problem, given our lack of 
introspective access to the causes of our behaviour, is that in practice we can never be sure that, 
in a particular instance, we are genuinely motivated by normative reasons. For this reason, I 
argued that our assessments of the normative reasons provided by agents should not give much 
weight to whether they are also motivating reasons or not—i.e. whether they are 
rationalisations of actions. Outside laboratory conditions, the identification of motivating 
reasons is a tricky issue and it is bound to lead to speculations, and we have the conceptual 
resources to assess normative reasons in themselves. 
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